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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Paul Anderson appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of aggravated assault and a weapon
enhancement. Anderson contends the district court erred in denying his motion
for mistrial based on a prospective juror's comment during voir dire.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Around 10:00 p.m. one evening, Anderson entered a Rite Aid store, asked
the cashier, Gloria Benton, where the beer was, and returned to Gloria's line with
a "12-pack." (Trial Tr., p.39, L.13 - p.40, L.13.) When Anderson returned to the
check-out line, Gloria was helping another customer, and Anderson started
complaining about how long she was taking. (Trial Tr., p.40, Ls.19-25.) Although
Gloria assured Anderson she would help him next, Anderson remained upset,
was mumbling, and using "foul language." (Trial Tr., p.40, L.24 - p.41, L.6, p.91,
Ls.5-14.)
Sherri Espinola, Gloria's shift supervisor, overheard Anderson and told
him his behavior was inappropriate, advised him they would not sell him any
beer, and she removed the beer from the counter. (Trial Tr., p.41, L.7 - p.42,
L.14, p.93, L.20 - p.94, L.2.)

When Sherri removed the beer, Anderson

threatened her and Gloria by showing them a knife clipped to his waistband and
telling them he would "take care" of them. (Trial Tr., p.42, L.15 - p.44, L.9, p.95,
Ls.3-16.) Anderson's knife was in a sheath and had a six-inch fixed blade. (Trial
Tr., p.45, Ls.8-9, p.146, Ls.6-9.)
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Understandably afraid, Sherri called 911, while Gloria, who was also
scared, tried to get Anderson to leave the store.

(Trial Tr., p.48, Ls.1-7, p.49,

Ls.18-20, p.52, Ls.2-8, p.96, L.18 - p.97, L.3.) Anderson eventually left and was
walking down the sidewalk where he was stopped by law enforcement. (Trial Tr.,
p.52, Ls.10-11, p.117, Ls.5-15.)
When law enforcement first made contact with Anderson, he refused to
follow their verbal commands and continued to approach them although one
officer had his weapon drawn. (Trial Tr., p.120, L.23 - p.122, L.22.) Anderson,
however, eventually complied and got down on his knees where he was
ultimately disarmed. Anderson was subsequently arrested and transported to the
jail. During transport, Anderson continued to act belligerent, was "rant[ing]" and
"rav[ing]," and referred to himself repeatedly as the "chief U.S. marine." (Trial Tr.,
p.122, L.22, p.132, L.17 - p.133, L.6, p.152, L.2 - p.153, L.18.)
The state charged Anderson with two counts of aggravated assault and
use of a deadly weapon during the commission of crime.

(R., pp.5-6, 23-27.)

Anderson pied not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. (R., p.34.)
During voir dire, in response to a question about whether any of the
prospective jurors had knowledge of the case, Juror 12 responded: "I am an Ada
County deputy sheriff.

I've been involved in the defendant's incarceration."

(Supp. Tr., p.15, Ls.8-14, p.16, Ls.15-18.) The court asked, "So you have some
personal knowledge of the case?" to which Juror 12 stated, "I don't know
anything about the case. I've just -- he's been in my housing unit before." (Supp.
Tr., p.16, Ls.19-23.) At that point, defense counsel asked to approach and there
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was a bench conference.

(Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.1-3.)

Following the bench

conference, the court instructed the jury panel as follows:
Ladies and Gentleman of the Jury, you just heard Juror No.
[12] make a statement concerning his knowledge of the defendant.
There will be evidence in this case that the defendant was arrested
and taken to jail. It's a criminal case. That is not in itself evidence
of his guilt; it will be simply one of the facts that comes out during
the trial. And you're not to use that fact as evidence of guilt. So
that -- please do not -- as I said, the defendant enjoys the
presumption of innocence, so the mere fact that he was arrested
does not mean he was guilty of anything at all, merely that
someone brought a charge.
(Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-18.)
Later, outside the presence of the jury panel, defense counsel made a
record of his request for a mistrial based on Juror 12's comments regarding the
circumstances under which he was familiar with Anderson, arguing that informing
the jurors that Anderson had been in custody "taint[ed]" them since Juror 12
"specifically said 'before"' instead of "with this incident." (Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.721.) The court set forth its reasons for denying the motion:
[W]e discussed this at side bar, and I overruled the objection for the
reason that I don't believe that it unfairly taints the jury in the
context in which the comment was made. You can take it "in my
unit before" as having been in connection with this, and I believe
the instruction that I gave will be adequate to resolve any potential
problems with the jury because they are going to, in fact, be told by
the prosecution the evidence will include the fact the defendant was
arrested. The natural consequence is being taken to jail. I don't
see that as being a grounds [sic] for mistrial at this point.
So that objection will be overruled. I will advise the parties
that it is my intention to excuse that juror for cause. Even in the
absence of -- I can tell you that now so you don't feel the need to
question him and run the risk of further potentially tainting the jury
to the point of getting a mistrial.

3
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(Supp. Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, L.17.) After the panel returned, and following
questioning of a different juror, the court excused Juror 12. (Supp. Tr., pp.7984.) The parties continued voir dire and both passed the panel for cause. (Supp.
Tr., pp.84-142.) The parties then exercised their peremptory challenges and the
selected jury was accepted by both sides and was sworn by the clerk. (Supp.
Tr., p.142, L.14-p.144, L.19.)
After trial, the jury found Anderson guilty of both counts of aggravated
assault and the weapon enhancement.

The court imposed a

unified five-year sentence with one year fixed on the first count of aggravated
assault and a concurrent unified, enhanced sentence of ten years with one year
fixed on the second count of aggravated assault.
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.108-110.)

I
I
I
I
I

(R., pp.96-98.)
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ISSUE

I

Anderson states the issue on appeal as:

I

Whether the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial after the
potential jury pool was tainted by comments on Mr. Anderson's
incarceration and by comments on his guilt and ability to assert his
innocence against the State's evidence.

I
I
I
I
I

(Revised Appellant's Brief1, p.7.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Anderson failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that
events in jury selection did not require a mistrial?

I
I
I
I
I
I
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I

Anderson filed his original brief on November 7, 2012, and the state filed the
Brief of Respondent on January 30, 2013. On April 4, 2013, Anderson filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Revised Brief and Affidavit ("Motion"), requesting leave
to revise his brief because the Appellant's Brief did not "articulate the legal basis
for th[e] claim" that he was deprived of his "right to a fair and impartial jury."
(Motion, p.3.) The Court granted Anderson's Motion. (Order Granting Motion for
Leave to File a Revised Appellant's Brief, dated May 10, 2013 (emphasis
original).) The "Issue" in the Revised Appellant's Brief is identical to the "Issue"
in the Appellant's Brief. (Compare Revised Appellant's Brief, p. 7 with Appellant's
Brief, p.7.) The only substantive change between the two briefs is the inclusion
of a paragraph regarding the constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.
(Compare Revised Appellant's Brief, p.9 with Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
1
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ARGUMENT
Anderson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion
For A Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Anderson contends the district court erred by not granting his motion for a

mistrial after Juror 12 "informed the pool that Mr. Anderson had been
incarcerated 'before."'

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

Anderson further argues that

even assuming Juror 12's "comment alone was insufficient to justify a mistrial,
subsequent comments" by a different prospective juror, which he did not object
to, "compounded the error to the point that a mistrial should have been declared,"
apparently sua sponte. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Application of the correct legal
standard shows both of Anderson's claims fail.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, the standard for review of a motion for mistrial is well-

established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of the circumstances existing when
the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be
whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial
represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full
record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a
criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer.
The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error.
[The appellate court's] focus is upon the continuing impact on the
trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial
judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that
incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted). Anderson bears the burden of showing that the trial court
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committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial. State v.
Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 674 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983). The appellate court
reviews the full record to determine if the event that triggered the motion for
mistrial "represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full
record." Rodriguez, 106 Idaho at 33,674 P.2d at 1032.
C.

Anderson Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of
His Motion For A Mistrial
A mistrial is appropriate where there has been conduct, inside or outside

of the courtroom, that is "prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant
of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Thus, the event triggering the mistrial motion must
be both prejudicial and deprive the defendant of a fair trial in order to warrant a
mistrial.
To show that he was denied a fair trial, Anderson must show that the
jurors heard the prospective jurors' comments and that they were, in fact,
prejudiced by the comments.2 See State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 301, 32 P.3d

2

Anderson notes his right to a fair trial and an impartial jury is guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution and that these rights are
"protect[ed]" by Idaho Code§§ 19-1902, -2019, -2020 and I.C.R. 24(b). (Revised
Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Anderson does not, however, articulate any basis for
construing the Idaho Constitution differently than the United States Constitution
with respect to his claim that the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial nor
does he provide any argument explaining how the Idaho Code or I.C.R. 24(b)
would modify the Court's analysis of the issue presented. Therefore, the Court
need not address any such "claim." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions
of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."); State v. Schaffer,
133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999) (Court will not interpret
state constitution differently from corresponding provisions of federal constitution
unless given a "cogent reason"); see State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825
P.2d 501, 504 (1992) (declining to address claim that state constitution provided
great protection because defendant failed to preserve argument in district court).
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685, 693 (Ct. App. 2001) (to show that a defendant was prejudiced by being
briefly viewed wearing restraints or jail clothes, there must be some evidence that
the jury saw the restraints and thereby drew a conclusion regarding the
defendant's character); State v. Wachholtz, 131 Idaho 74, 77, 952 P.2d 396, 399
(Ct. App. 1998) ("[t]he defense provided no evidence that any juror was aware of
- much less prejudiced by - the stun belt incident").

Although a criminal

defendant is entitled to a fair jury panel, it is sufficient that the jurors may render
a verdict based on the evidence presented in court instead of information
gathered outside of that evidence. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 795 (1975)
(quoting Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)). The purpose of voir dire is to
discover if potential jurors are not qualified to sit as jurors, and a defendant is not
entitled to a mistrial based on statements by potential jurors in voir dire unless
there is a "continuing impact on the trial." State v. Laymon, 140 Idaho 768, 771,
101 P.3d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 2004) (no continuing impact due to curative
instruction).
Anderson has failed to demonstrate Juror 12's comments had a continuing
impact on his trial.

In response to a question about whether any of the

prospective jurors had knowledge of Anderson's case, Juror 12, an Ada County
deputy sheriff, stated he had been "involved in [Anderson's] incarceration" and
that Anderson had "been in [his] housing unit before." (Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.1523.) In order to address defense counsel's concern that the comment could be
interpreted to mean that Anderson had been in jail in relation to an event other
than the one that resulted in the criminal charges in this case, the court instructed
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the panel that they would hear evidence that Anderson was taken to jail but that
such evidence could not be considered as evidence that Anderson was guilty.
(Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-18, p.75, L.9 - p.76, L.10.)
Anderson argues that the panel could have interpreted Juror 12's
comments one of two ways, both of which he claims are improper. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.9-11.) First, Anderson contends the jurors could have understood Juror
12's comments to mean that he "was incarcerated on this charge and remained
incarcerated at the time of trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Anderson asserts this
interpretation required a mistrial because "references to the fact that a defendant
has been or remains jailed on the charged offense are inappropriate and
prejudicial." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) This argument fails because it is contrary to
the grounds Anderson stated in support of his motion for a mistrial and is
effectively a challenge to evidence at trial that is being raised for the first time on
appeal. State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 668, 289 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Ct. App.
2012) ("Idaho appellate courts generally will not consider an assertion of error on
appeal unless the issue was preserved in the trial court proceedings.") (citations
omitted).

The stated basis for the motion for mistrial was the concern that

prospective jurors may have understood Juror 12's comments to mean that
Anderson had been in jail "before," and not in relation to "this incident." (Supp.
Tr., p.75, Ls.15-21.) Anderson's appellate argument that a mistrial was required
because the jurors received information that he was incarcerated on "this
charge," was not preserved either as a basis for the motion for a mistrial or as an
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evidentiary matter since there was no objection to evidence that Anderson was,
in fact, taken to jail when he was arrested on the aggravated assault charges.
Anderson's appellate argument that his motion should have been granted
because the jurors could have interpreted Juror 12's comments to mean that he
remained incarcerated at the time of trial is also not preserved. Moreover, this
interpretation of Juror 12's comments is not reasonable given Juror 12's use of
the past tense in referring to his involvement with Anderson's incarceration and
the court's curative instruction.

Even if the interpretation was reasonable, the

court's curative instruction addressed any poteritial lasting prejudicial impact from
Juror 12's comments.

Anderson's claim that the instruction did not cure any

potential lasting prejudice is unpersuasive.
Anderson argues the court's curative instruction did not "alleviate the
undertone that permeated the proceedings from that point forward:

that Mr.

Anderson was in jail, and thus more likely to be guilty." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.)
This argument does nothing more than assume the jurors ignored the instruction;
an assumption that is itself contrary to law. State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 544,
285 P.3d 348, 359 (Ct. App. 2012) (it is presumed that jurors follow the court's
instructions).
Anderson further argues "the fact that Juror 12 was not immediately
dismissed for cause indicated to the jury that his comments were not overly
problematic." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) According to Anderson, this may have
led "other potential jurors ... not to speak up, even though they have had
underlying biases against [him]." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Anderson reasons,
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"After all, if one of the officers who oversees [his] incarceration is allowed to
remain in the jury pool, why should their own biases as to guilt be more
problematic that Juror 12's?" (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) In addition to being
entirely speculative, Anderson's argument is contradicted by his subsequent
reliance on biases expressed by Juror 32 in support of his claim that he was
entitled to a mistrial for reasons other than Juror 12's comments, which will be
addressed in Section D, infra. Moreover, Anderson's argument is predicated on
a remedy he did not request below, i.e., immediate removal of Juror 12 for cause.
Because Anderson has failed to show Juror 12's comments had any
continuing impact on his trial, he has failed to establish error in the district court's
denial of his motion for mistrial.

D.

Juror 32's Comments And The District Court's Instruction Regarding Use
Of The Word "Victim" Are Irrelevant To Anderson's Motion For Mistrial
Anderson contends, "Two comments subsequent to Juror 12's prejudicial

remarks further demonstrate that the jury pool was tainted and a mistrial should
have been ordered." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Specifically, Anderson complains
that Juror 32, a "former legal assistant with thirty years of experience made a
rather concerning statement about how the trial process should work after
declaring herself to be 'very biased."'

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

In particular,

Anderson cites to the following voir dire of Juror 32:
[PROSECUTOR]: Can you let go of your former life and just accept
the role as a juror if you are selected here?
JUROR 32: I don't know. I'm very biased, very biased.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. For or against who?
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JUROR 32: I have no use for people with a victim mentality.

[PROSECUTOR]: Can you tell me what a victim mentality is?
JUROR 32: Won't or can't take responsibility for their own actions
or interactions. It's always somebody else's fault.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Well, let me ask you this: They're [sic]
going to be some people who come in, and they are going to say,
"This thing happened. I saw this, I heard this. I felt like this." The
court may occasionally call them victims because that's what the
law calls them, but [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I will object to that. There is no
determination on that. I think the court will instruct the jurors on
that.
THE COURT: I will note your objection, [Counsel].
And, [Mr. Prosecutor], I do my best to refer to them as
alleged victims, because that's what they are until the close of the
evidence.
But I think we understand, so I will overrule the
objection. You may inquire.
[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you. He cut me off.
The point, ma'am, is that these people who - we call them
alleged victims. They are the people the state says that this crime
happened to.
JUROR 32: I understand that. That is not a victim mentality.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. That answered that question.
My other question is, I don't know -- you understand that Mr.
Anderson has no duty to present a defense or any evidence, okay?
I have to put on enough evidence to convince all of you beyond a
reasonable doubt that the things happened that the judge says
have to happen before you can check the guilty box, right?
If he chooses to present evidence and it is evidence, or his
lawyer chooses to question the witnesses, the gist of which is,
"Well, it didn't happen that way," or, "You shouldn't believe him," or,

12
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"It happened, but it doesn't mean what the state says it means," is
that going to be a victim mentality for you?
JUROR 32: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Well, you kind of understand that's the
way the system works, right?
JUROR 32:
work.

I don't believe it's the way the system is meant to

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.
JUROR 32: It is the way it works unfortunately.
(Supp. Tr., p.80, L.17 - p.83, L.5.)
Anderson acknowledges that he did not object to Juror 32's comments, or
request a mistrial based on her comments, but contends such was unnecessary
to this Court's consideration of whether the district court should have granted his
earlier motion for mistrial in relation to Juror 12's comments. (Appellant's Brief,
p.14.)

While it is true that this Court considers the "full record" in deciding

whether a trial judge should have granted a motion for mistrial, it does so for the
purpose of assessing "the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion."

Shepherd, supra.

Such review does not, as

Anderson suggests, encompass a review of all alleged errors in the proceedings.
(Appellant's Brief, p.15 ("where, as here, the jury pool was subjected to prejudice
by first one, then another juror's comments, the appellate court should vacate the
conviction and remand for a new trial because of the aggregated prejudice, even
though the motion for a mistrial may not be renewed").)
There is absolutely no relationship between Juror 32's expressions of bias
and Juror 12's comment that Anderson was in his "housing unit" at the jail, and
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Anderson has identified no such relationship.

Rather, Anderson asserts that

because he believes both comments were prejudicial, a mistrial "should have
been declared." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8, 15.) This is not the standard of review
of the motion that was made and Anderson has failed to cite any authority that
compelled the trial court to sua sponte declare a mistrial as a result of Juror 32's
unrelated comments.
In relation to Juror 32's responses, Anderson also complains "[t]here was
no curative instruction." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Anderson did not, however,
request such an instruction and it is unclear why Anderson believes the court is
required to give an instruction to "cure" a potential juror's expression of bias.
Such an instruction seems contrary to the very purpose of voir dire, which is to
discover bias and remove those individuals who are not qualified to serve on the
jury. Laymon, 140 Idaho at 771, 101 P.3d at 715.
Anderson also takes issue with the court's response to counsel's objection
to the prosecutor's use of the word "victim" to describe the witnesses who would
testify in support of the aggravated assault charges.

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

Anderson asserts "[t]he natural implication" of the court's statement, "I do my
best to refer to them as alleged victims, because that's what they are until the
close of evidence," was that "once the evidence period closes, then we can refer
to them as actual victims, as opposed to 'alleged' victims because the evidence
will show that they were actually victimized by the defendant." (Appellant's Brief,
p.16.) Of course, Anderson can cite to nothing to support his assertion that this
is how the prospective jurors interpreted the court's comment (made at defense
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counsel's urging), and, in any event, he has failed to identify how the court's
comment was the result of Juror 12's earlier statement about Anderson's
incarceration.
Not all of Anderson's perceived flaws of what occurred during voir dire are
relevant to the issue before this Court - whether the district court's denial of the
motion for mistrial, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. In fact,
Anderson has failed to identify any continuing impact resulting from Juror 12's
comments, i.e., the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. As such, Anderson
has failed to establish error in the denial of his motion for mistrial. 3

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Anderson's convictions.
DATED this 10th day of July, 2013.

JESSI~
Deputy Attorney General

In addition to attempting to cumulate perceived errors under the motion for
mistrial standard of review, it appears Anderson also contends he is entitled to
relief under the cumulative error doctrine. (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) "[l[t is wellestablished that alleged errors at trial, that are not followed by a
contemporaneous objection, will not be considered under the cumulative error
doctrine unless said errors are found to pass the threshold analysis under our
fundamental error doctrine." State v. Perrv, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961,
982 (2010).
Because Anderson has not even attempted to demonstrate
fundamental error in relation to his unpreserved complaints about voir dire, and
because he has failed to establish any error in relation to the motion for mistrial,
the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.
3
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